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ALL’S FAIR IN LOVE AND WAR: 
BUT WHAT ABOUT IN DIVORCE? 
THE FAIRNESS OF PROPERTY DIVISION IN 
AMERICAN AND ENGLISH BIG MONEY DIVORCE CASES 
MARGARET RYZNAR* 
“A lot of people have asked me how short I am. 
Since my last divorce, I think I’m about $100,000 short.”1 
—Mickey Rooney 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Eyebrows have recently arched not only at the high sums involved in 
big money divorce cases, but also at the amount of ink spilled on this 
relatively small subset of divorce cases.  Yet, it is precisely in big money 
cases, wherein judges have discretion over resources that significantly 
exceed the needs of the parties, that fairness acquires substantial haziness.  
The question of fairness is particularly acute in short marriages, as well as 
when one spouse is at fault for the divorce or when one spouse contributes 
extraordinarily to the marriage.  Courts in both England and the United 
States have been encountering these issues with increasing frequency and 
differing results.  The majority of American courts have employed the 
principle of equitable distribution, resulting in a disproportionate property 
division between spouses, particularly when the marital estate grew because 
of one spouse’s extraordinary efforts.  England, on the other hand, has re-
cently implemented a yardstick of equality that aims for near equal property 
division between spouses, representing a major shift in English case law 
and a doctrinal break from American law.  This article examines these 
 
*Attorney, Washington, D.C.  J.D., Notre Dame Law School; M.A. European Studies, 
Jagiellonian University; B.A. Economics, English Language and Literature, Political Science, and 
Law, Letters, and Society, University of Chicago.  Many thanks to Susan Blake at The City Law 
School in London, England, for her helpful guidance on English divorce law; Geoffrey J. Bennett 
at the University of Notre Dame Law School, London campus, for constructive conversations on 
the topic; and Margaret F. Brining at the University of Notre Dame Law School for her invaluable 
input.  I am also grateful for commentary from the participants at the Thirteenth World 
Conference of the International Society of Family Law in Vienna, Austria, at which this paper was 
presented.  Finally, I appreciate the skillful editing of the members of the NORTH DAKOTA LAW 
REVIEW.  This article was written in my individual capacity and all opinions are my own. 
1. ROBERT ANDREWS, THE COLUMBIA DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 248 (1993). 
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changes in the comparative context, underscoring the consequences of each 
country’s interpretation of fairness in post-divorce property division. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Although divorce bears the brunt of many jokes, the high stakes 
involved in big money marriages is no laughing matter.  Beatle Paul 
McCartney reportedly settled with Heather Mills for $64 million, nearly 
$1800 for every hour of their marriage.2  Sumner Redstone, at the helm of 
media giant Viacom, settled with his ex-wife for approximately one billion 
pounds in 2002.3  Princess Diana’s settlement reportedly totaled £17.5 
million.4  However, the record for the most expensive divorce may be set by 
actor Mel Gibson’s recently announced divorce:  he stands to lose half of 
his $1 billion fortune.5  Indeed, newspapers are rich with stories of big 
money divorces because, while marriage may be for richer or poorer, 
separating spouses are far less financially indifferent. 
Eyebrows have arched not only at the high sums involved in big money 
cases, but also at the amount of ink spilled on this relatively small subset of 
divorce cases.6  Critics contend big money cases lack social justice issues7 
and it is therefore preferable to focus on financially ruined, fragmented 
families.8  Yet, it is precisely in big money cases the words “justice” and 
“fairness” acquire significant haziness.9  For example, is it fair for a high-
wage earner to pay an ex-spouse half of all future profits?  Or, would it be 
 
2. Jennifer Conlin, Divorce: Money Changes Everything, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2007, 
http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/02/09/yourmoney/mdivorce.php?page=1. 
3. Michael Moran, The 20 Most Expensive Divorces of All Time, TIMES ONLINE, March 16, 
2007, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/most_curious/article1516355.ece. 
4. Id. 
5. Jill Brooke, Do You Really Think Mel Gibson Is Bothered by Giving His Wife $400 
Million?, THE HUFFINGTON POST, Apr. 14, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jill-brooke/do-
you-really-think-mel-g_b_186801.html. 
6. See, e.g., Patrick Parkinson, The Yardstick of Equality:  Assessing Contributions in 
Australia and England, 19 INT’L J.L. & POL’Y & FAM. 163, 172 (2005).  There is certainly no 
shortage of divorce cases on which to focus; in 2003, there was one divorce for every two 
marriages. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, 
National Vital Statistics Reports, Vol. 52, No. 22 (June 10, 2004), available at http://www. 
cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr52/nvsr52_22.pdf. 
7. Parkinson, supra note 6, at 172. 
8. Unfortunately, even the average divorce case can leave parties financially ruined.  In 1993, 
for example, the mean income for divorced American mothers was $17,859, while for divorced 
fathers it was $31,034.  Arthur B. LaFrance, Child Custody and Relocation:  A Constitutional 
Perspective, 34 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 1, 6 (1996).  But see Kelly Bedard & Olivier 
Deschênes, Sex Preferences, Marital Dissolution, and the Economic Status of Women, 40 J. HUM. 
RESOURCES 411 (2004) (arguing that divorced women live in households with more income per 
person than never-divorced women). 
9. In the average divorce case, few assets remain post-division over which to fight, mooting 
most questions of fairness.  Another significant grey area in divorce law occurs when the only 
assets are tied up with future earning capacity. 
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fairer for the lower income earner to receive a smaller portion of the ex-
spouse’s net worth, which still totals millions of dollars?  Such questions 
are particularly acute in short marriages or when one spouse is at fault for 
the marital breakdown. 
While American state courts have been encountering these problems 
with increasing frequency in recent years, English courts have been 
resolving them rather controversially, emerging as “the Harrods, as it were, 
for those shopping for divorce jurisdictions.”10  This honor of sorts is sur-
prising given that both the American and English legal systems share the 
goal of fairness in property distribution.  Indeed, the commonalities be-
tween the two systems peak in the average divorce case, when a divorcing 
couple’s assets are just sufficient to meet the needs of both spouses.11  In 
such cases, each spouse receives enough to cover reasonable needs, with 
little surplus over which to litigate.  However, it is in big money cases, 
often when only one spouse contributes an extraordinary amount of money 
to the marriage, that English and American divorce law diverge, 
particularly since the House of Lords’ 2000 landmark decision in White v. 
White.12 
Importantly, the English approach has practical, direct consequences 
for American divorcing couples—jurisdiction for divorce requires only the 
domicile of one party.13  If one American spouse becomes domiciled in 
England, it is conceivable the divorce may occur there.  Therefore, many 
divorce battles begin over which jurisdiction is the appropriate forum, 
assuming the availability of several.  This is particularly true in the Euro-
pean Union, where member states’ boundaries do not pose citizenship or 
mobility barriers.14 
The English treatment of big money divorce cases offers significant 
lessons for the American legal system, particularly on the meaning of 
fairness in property division.  Specifically, the English experience raises 
questions of whether there should be a distinction among divorcing couples 
based on their financial situation, and if so, what that distinction should be.  
While American law currently lacks any clear legal distinction between big 
 
10. Conlin, supra note 2. 
11. See Fact Sheet, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/ACSSA 
FFFacts?_submenuId=factsheet_1&_sse=on (last visited Sept. 27, 2010).  The mean income for 
an American household is $46,242, usually insufficient to generate sums that would result in a 
surplus after the spouses’ basic needs were met. Id. 
12. [2001] 1 A.C. 596 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.). 
13. See, e.g., J. Thomas Oldham, What if the Beckhams Move to LA and Divorce? Marital 
Property Rights of Mobile Spouses When They Divorce in the United States, 42 FAM. L.Q. 263, 
274 (2008). 
14. See, e.g., id. at 264. 
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money divorce cases and the rest,15 English case law occasionally explicitly 
addresses big money couples.  Even the relevant terminology is lacking in 
the United States, although there has been some reference to the “prodi-
gious spouse” or the “wealthy wage earner” to describe the spouse who 
contributed more to a marriage financially.16 
This article endeavors to compare the American and English ap-
proaches to post-divorce property division, probing the meaning of fairness 
in each jurisdiction.  Part II begins by briefly surveying American divorce 
law on property division, focusing on the equitable distribution principle 
used by the majority of states.  Part III examines the English legal approach 
to big money divorces, which rests on the yardstick of equality approach.  
Finally, Part IV extracts the lessons from a comparison of these legal 
systems, underscoring the consequences of each country’s interpretation of 
fairness in post-divorce property division. 
II. THE AMERICAN MAJORITY PRINCIPLE: 
EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION 
Divorces in the United States are governed by state law, and any 
generalization is difficult.17  However, post-divorce property division often 
proceeds in two stages.  The first is determining the assets.  This is gener-
ally governed by statutory law in all states,18 as well as contract law, if the 
parties entered into a premarital agreement.  The second stage is the divi-
sion of assets, which is also typically defined by statute.19  The principle 
that governs this second stage in the majority of states is equitable distri-
bution, which seeks an equitable, but not necessarily equal, division 
between the spouses.  A minority of states, however, utilize community 
 
15. The treatment of professional degrees may be an exception. See discussion infra Part 
II.D. 
16. See Debra DiMaggio, The “Prodigious Spouse”:  Equitable Distribution and Wealthy 
Wage Earner, 91 ILL. B.J. 460, 460 (2003). 
17. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 256 (1983) (“Rules governing the inheritance of 
property, adoption, and child custody are generally specified in statutory enactments that vary 
from State to State.  Moreover, equally varied state laws governing marriage and divorce affect a 
multitude of parent-child relationships.”). 
18. The details of these statutes vary among the states.  For example, the relevant Illinois 
statute subjects only marital property to division. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/503(a)-(b) (1993).  
Furthermore, there is a rebuttable presumption that property acquired during the marriage is 
marital property that is divisible upon divorce. Id.  Finally, property gained before marriage or by 
gift does not qualify as marital property in Illinois. Id. 
19. The relevant Illinois statute is typical in providing a list of factors courts should consider 
when dividing marital property, which is to be equitably divided regardless of who holds title to 
the property. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/503(a)-(b). 
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property, which favors a more equal property division between the 
spouses.20 
The well-established nature of equitable distribution in most jurisdic-
tions, however, has hardly slowed the debate regarding the most appropriate 
post-divorce property division.  Instead, disagreement on this issue has 
fueled litigation, challenging the proper division of property upon divorce. 
Before turning to this debate, it is helpful to define terminology at the 
outset.  This article combines American and British semantics throughout:  
the term “big money” refers to those divorce cases wherein the resources 
significantly exceed the financial needs of the parties, and the term “higher 
income spouse” will describe the spouse that financially contributes to the 
marriage through exceptional efforts.  Although in many big money cases it 
is difficult to isolate one spouse as the higher income spouse because of the 
equal or extraordinary nature of both parties’ contributions to the marriage, 
this article mostly restricts its analysis to those big money cases that result 
from the exceptional efforts of a higher income spouse. 
A. THE DEBATE REGARDING EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION 
By definition, the principle of equitable distribution requires the courts 
to divide property between divorcing parties equitably.  However, such a 
division does not necessarily mean an equal split between the parties;21 
even a 95-5 division can be equitable.22  The generally accepted theory of 
equitable division likens the division of property upon divorce to that of 
partnership dissolution.23  While each partner has a stake in the partnership, 
all shares are not equal.  Thus, upon dissolution of the partnership, each 
partner only receives the share that corresponds to his contribution.  In the 
marital context, however, contributions are not limited to the assets that 
 
20. See Jeffrey G. Sherman, Prenuptial Agreements:  A New Reason to Revive an Old Rule, 
53 CLEV. L. REV. 359, 370 (2005-2006).  See also, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 2550-56 (2007).  In 
the community property system, each spouse has an interest in the community property, as 
opposed to separate spousal property holdings. Ira Mark Ellman, O’Brien v. O’Brien:  A Failed 
Reform, Unlikely Reformers, 27 PACE L. REV. 949, 951 (2007). 
21. See, e.g., Alston v. Alston, 629 A.2d 70, 79 (Md. 1993).  The Alston court stated: 
Where one party, wholly through his or her own efforts, and without any direct or 
indirect contribution by the other, acquires a specific item of marital property after the 
parties have separated and after the marital family has, as a practical matter, ceased to 
exist, a monetary award representing an equal division of that particular property 
would not ordinarily be consonant with the history and purpose of the statute. 
Id. 
22. See, e.g., Bean v. Bean, 115 S.W.3d 388, 393 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003).  For a useful analysis 
of judicial discretion in equitable distribution divisions, see generally Sanford N. Katz, 73 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1251 (1998). 
23. BRETT R. TURNER, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY § 8:1 (3d ed., vol. 2 2005). 
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each spouse brings, but also extend to those contributions made to the 
marriage generally, such as child care. 
In determining a particular division under the equitable distribution 
approach, courts consider several legislated factors, such as the length of 
marriage, the causes for the dissolution of the marriage, the age and health 
of the parties, and the amount and sources of income, as well as the voca-
tional skills, liabilities, and needs of each party.24  In these states, the courts, 
therefore, have significant discretion in property division, and the resulting 
decisions are often fact-specific.  However, equitable distribution has trig-
gered substantial litigation on the proper division of assets following a 
divorce.  The debate regarding the meaning of “equitable” is particularly 
acute in the subset of divorce cases involving wealthier couples.  In these 
cases, property divisions are often significantly disproportionate in order to 
reflect one partner’s significant financial contribution to the marriage, an 
outcome that has been vigorously challenged in the courts.  In such 
challenges, lower income spouses25 have primarily argued that nothing 
short of an equal division can be equitable—an argument embraced by the 
American Law Institute (ALI) Principles.26 
B. MODEL STATUTES AND EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION:  THE ALI 
PRINCIPLES AND UMDA 
The ALI Principles, which cover many different areas of American 
law, generally inspire some debate from the legal community.27  These 
principles, although influential, do not become the law in any jurisdiction 
until legislative or judicial action implements them.  On the issue of post-
 
24. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 46b-81 to -82 (1958); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/504 
(1993). 
25. The wives of corporate executives, occasionally referred to as “corporate wives,” com-
prise one category of big money plaintiffs in the United States who are fueling litigation on the 
meaning of the term “equitable.” See, e.g., Wendt v. Wendt, 757 A.2d 1225, 1230-31 (Conn. App. 
Ct. 2000); McMackin v. McMackin, 651 A.2d 778, 781 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1993); In re Marriage of 
Nesbitt, 879 N.E.2d 445, 447 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007); see also infra note 35.  Homemakers are 
another category of big money divorce plaintiffs.  However, the stereotypical household of a 
patriarchical order is no longer necessarily true, with many women outperforming their husbands 
in the workplace. DiMaggio, supra note 16, at 470; see also Whispell v. Whispell, 534 N.Y.S.2d 
557, 558 (1988) (justifying the ex-husband’s low share of the marital property based on his 
“negative contribution to the marriage”).  Thus, it is important to underscore that the equitable 
distribution principle is gender-neutral:  all people who contribute an unusual amount of property 
to their marriage are allowed a share that reflects their extraordinary efforts. 
26. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
27. See, e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, Introduction to the Symposium on the American Law 
Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, 4 J.L. FAM. STUD. 1, 1 (2002); Troxel v. 
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 101 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (referring to ALI’s criticism of the 
best interests of the child standard). 
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divorce property division, the ALI Principles28 adopt the minority American 
view of property division, rejecting equitable distribution in favor of a 
strong presumption of equal division.29  There are limited exceptions, such 
as if one spouse commits financial misconduct.30 
Despite the strong preference of the ALI Principles for equal division, 
however, most states have enacted equitable distribution statutes.31  These 
parallel another model statute, the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act of 
1970 and 1973 (UMDA).  The UMDA, promulgated by the National 
 
28. For an excellent background and commentary on the drafting of the ALI Principles in 
Family Law, and on property division in particular, see Marsha Garrison, The Economic 
Consequences of Divorce:  Would Adoption of the ALI Principles Improve Current Outcomes?, 8 
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 119, 123 (2001).  “Although the American Law Institute is best-
known for its Restatements of the Law, ‘the current disarray in family law’ led the Institute to opt, 
in this Project, for principles that would ‘give greater weight to emerging legal concepts’ than 
would a Restatement.” Id. (quoting Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Foreword to PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW 
OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:  ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Proposed Final Draft 1997)). 
29. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:  ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS § 4.15(1) (Proposed Final Draft 1997) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES].  Section 4.15(1) in the 
American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recom-
mendations states, “In every dissolution of marriage, the presumption arises that marital property 
shall be divided so that the spouses receive marital property equal in value, although not 
necessarily identical in kind.” Id.  The presumption can be rebutted when:  (1) it is equitable to 
compensate a spouse for a “loss recognized,” in whole or in part, with an enhanced share of the 
marital property; or (2) one spouse is entitled to an enhanced share of the marital property because 
the other spouse previously made an improper disposition of some portion of it. Id. § 4.15(2)(a)-
(b).  See also Craig W. Dallon, The Likely Impact of the ALI of the Law of Family Dissolution on 
Property Division, 2001 BYU L. REV. 891, 892 (2001).  Professor Dallon also noted the ALI 
Principles distinguish themselves from the majority of jurisdictions by rejecting the discretionary 
factors used in equitable distribution cases and by proposing a recharacterization of separate assets 
to marital assets over the course of a long marriage. Id. 
30. PRINCIPLES, supra note 29, § 4.15(2) (Proposed Final Draft 1997).  Specifically, unequal 
division is permitted when: 
(a) the court concludes . . . that it is equitable to compensate a spouse for a loss [that 
would otherwise result in an alimony award under] Chapter 5, in whole or in part, with 
an enhanced share of the marital property; or (b) the court concludes under § 4.16 that 
one spouse is entitled to an enhanced share of the marital property because the other 
spouse previously made an improper disposition of some portion of it; or (c) marital 
debts exceed marital assets, and it is just and equitable to assign the excess debt 
unequally, because of a significant disparity in the spouses’ financial capacity, their 
participation in the decision to incur the debt, or their consumption of the goods or 
services that the debt was incurred to acquire. 
Id. 
31. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-113 (2001); 13 DEL CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1513 
(2001); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/503 (2001); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 8-205 (2001); NEV. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 125.150 (2001); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458.16 (2000); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW 
§ 236 (Consol. 2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20 (2000); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105,171 (2001); 
23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3502 (West 2001); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16.1 (2001); TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 36-4-121 (2001); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 751 (2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3 (2001).  
For a discussion of the impact of the ALI Principles on equitable distribution, see JOHN DEWITT 
GREGORY, JANET LEACH RICHARDS & SHERYL WOLF, PROPERTY DIVISION IN DIVORCE 
PROCEEDINGS:  A FIFTY STATE GUIDE, 2006 SUPPLEMENT 1-32-38.1 (2006). 
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Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,32 advocates equi-
table distribution of marital property at divorce, which often results in 
disproportionate property divisions that trigger litigation by lower income 
spouses.33  Thus, the position of the ALI Principles on post-divorce 
property division remains the minority American approach. 
C. THE INTERPRETATION OF EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION IN CASE 
LAW:  WENDT V. WENDT 
Although American law does not distinguish among divorce cases 
based on financial stakes, the division of property in high net divorce cases 
has the most potential to result in a disproportionate division, especially in 
equitable distribution states.  Specifically, the higher income earner typi-
cally receives a larger amount to reflect a higher marital contribution.  
However, this outcome has often been vigorously challenged in American 
state courts by lower income spouses. 
One of the most famous cases challenging equitable distribution is 
Wendt v. Wendt,34 where the wife demanded exactly half of the marital 
estate that she valued at $100 million.35  After Mrs. Wendt rejected her ex-
husband’s $8 million settlement and $250,000 in annual alimony, a 
Connecticut court awarded her approximately $20 million in one of the 
largest divorce rulings in American history.36  She appealed the decision, 
seeking half of his future earnings, based on the argument that only an 
equal distribution is an equitable one.37 
Mr. and Mrs. Wendt were high school sweethearts and married on July 
31, 1965, in Wisconsin.38  The plaintiff wife, Mrs. Lorna Wendt, was a 
public school music teacher early in their marriage, earning modest 
wages.39  After quitting her employment, she had been a mother, 
 
32. See UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 307 alternatives A-B (amended 1973), 9A 
U.L.A. 288 (1998); Elijah L. Milne, Recharacterizing Separate Property at Divorce, 84 U. DET. 
MERCY L. REV. 307, 310 (2007). 
33. See discussion supra Part II.A.; infra Part II.C. 
34. No. FA96 0149562 S., 1998 WL 161165 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 31, 1998), aff’d, 757 
A.2d 1225 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000). 
35. See Betsy Morris, It’s Her Job Too Lorna Wendt’s $20 Million Divorce Case is the Shot 
Heard ‘Round the Water Cooler, CNNMONEY.COM, Feb. 2, 1998, http://money.cnn.com/ 
magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/1998/02/02/237198/index.htm.  Wendt generated much 
commentary on the role of a corporate wife. See, e.g., Paul Barett, Wendt Divorce Dissects Job of 
“Corporate Wife,” WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 1996, at B1, B17. 
36. See Morris, supra note 35. 
37. Wendt, 1998 WL 161165 at *42. 
38. Id. at *1. 
39. Id. 
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homemaker, and corporate wife.40  The defendant’s husband, Mr. Gary C. 
Wendt, was the Chairman, President, and Chief Executive Officer of GE 
Capital Services, Inc.41  The couple had two daughters who were grown and 
self-sufficient at the time of the divorce in 1995.42 
Mrs. Wendt claimed her contributions to Mr. Wendt’s career entitled 
her to half of all his worth because she was his equal partner during the 
marriage.43  Specifically, throughout his career, she discussed his work with 
him.44  She entertained guests at their multi-million dollar home in 
Stamford, Connecticut, and accommodated invitations “to parties in New 
York City, out-of-town dinners or a golf engagement.”45  She would occa-
sionally accompany Mr. Wendt on expensive and exotic corporate trips.46  
At trial, she described herself as the “ultimate hostess”47 and a “corporate 
wife.”48  Additionally, Mrs. Wendt argued that her homemaking marital 
contributions entitled her to an equal share of the marital estate.49  She thus 
introduced evidence of her care for the children, duties of cooking, and 
general maintenance of the household, albeit with hired help.50 
Mrs. Wendt’s homemaking contributions were undisputed, as was the 
quality of those services.51  However, the court found her view of the 
contributions she made to Mr. Wendt’s career to be exaggerated.52  Mr. 
Wendt’s contributions to GE and the family finances, however, were extra-
ordinary.53  During his time at GE Capital, the company’s earnings surged 
from $271 million to $2.8 billion.54  After hearing testimony on Mr. 
 
40. Id.  However, at trial, “The plaintiff offered an expert witness to support her claim that 
she is entitled to a substantial distribution in the tens of millions of dollars by reason of giving up 
her career as a public school music teacher.” Id. at *21. 
41. Id. at *11. 
42. Id. at *6. 
43. Id. at *19.  Mrs. Wendt summarized her view of the legal issues:  “Marriage is a 
partnership, and I should be entitled to 50%.  I gave thirty-one years of my life.  I loved the 
defendant.  I worked hard and I was very loyal.” Id. at *1. 
44. Id. at *5. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. at *13-*14. 
47. Id. at *14, *16. 
48. Id. at *5. 
49. Id. at *1, *19. 
50. Id. at *5, *12. 
51. Id. at *7. 
52. Id. at *16.  For example, during a business trip to Poland, “[w]hile the defendant had 
meetings and lunches with the Polish Ministry of Finance, a representative of the Polish Center 
Bank, the President of the Gdansk Solidarity Bank and other executives, the plaintiff had a 15 
minute tour of the city, watched a 20 minute movie in the historical museum and spent from 9:30 
a.m. to 1:00 p.m. shopping.” Id. 
53. Id. at *8. 
54. Id. at *11. 
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Wendt’s extraordinary vision for GE and his exceptional leadership skills, 
the court found that Mr. Wendt made the most substantial contributions to 
GE of all its employees.55 
The court ultimately accepted the value of Mrs. Wendt’s non-monetary 
contributions to a marriage, stating: 
It is widely recognized that the primary aim of property distri-
bution [under the equitable distribution principle] is to recognize 
that marriage is, among other things, “a shared enterprise or joint 
undertaking in the nature of a partnership to which both spouses 
contribute-directly and indirectly, financially and nonfinancially—
the fruits of which are distributable at divorce.”56 
Nonetheless, the court recognized that there are multiple factors to property 
division, only one of which is contributions.  Other potential factors include 
the dissipation of assets, the duration of the marriage, and any premarital 
agreement between the parties regarding the distribution of the property.57  
In Illinois, another state adhering to equitable distribution, the courts may 
consider the quality of the homemaker’s contributions and whether the 
homemaker had been frugal or extravagant.  The courts may also quantify 
the homemaker’s contributions.58  The Connecticut Superior Court en-
dorsed this approach in Wendt: 
The court must consider all of the statutory criteria in determining 
how to divide the parties’ property in a dissolution action.  A trial 
court, however, need not give each factor equal weight; or recite 
the statutory criteria that it considered in making its decision or 
make express findings as to each statutory factor.59 
In so doing, the Connecticut Superior Court rejected section 4.15 of the 
ALI Principles on Family Dissolution60 and the equal division presumption, 
noting it cannot become law “until the legislature sees fit to change the 
statutes.”61  The court also confirmed the principle of equitable distribution 
does not mean equal division.  On the contrary, an equitable distribution 
often requires an unequal division of marital property, particularly in those 
cases where the marital estate grew significantly because of the 
 
55. Id. 
56. Id. at *27 (quoting JOHN DEWITT GREGORY ET AL., THE LAW OF EQUITABLE 
DISTRIBUTION § 1.03, at 1-6 (1989)). 
57. DiMaggio, supra note 16, at 462.  See also infra Part IV.D. 
58. DiMaggio, supra note 16, at 463. 
59. Wendt, 1998 WL 161165 at *28. 
60. See supra Part II.B. 
61. Wendt, 1998 WL 161165 at *115. See also id. at *87. 
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extraordinary contributions of the higher income spouse.62  The appellate 
panel in Wendt affirmed the lower court’s judgment of an unequal property 
division, confirming that equitable distribution does not necessarily mean 
equal distribution.63 
D. PROFESSIONAL DEGREES AS SUBJECT TO PROPERTY DIVISION 
Although American courts do not separately address big money divor-
ces as their English counterparts do, their treatment of professional degrees 
typically implicates big money couples.64  Many graduate degrees in busi-
ness, law, and medicine, which generate significant income for their hold-
ers, are subject to intense, big money court battles in the United States.65  
American cases involving professional degrees are, therefore, somewhat 
akin to English big money cases in this way. 
Section 4.07 of the ALI Principles, which favors equal division of 
property between the spouses, does not consider occupational licenses and 
educational degrees as subject to division upon divorce.66  This reflects the 
viewpoint of most American jurisdictions, which refuses to treat such assets 
as marital property instead of as personal attainment.  This view is but-
tressed by a degree’s characteristic lack of value, nonassignability, and 
personal nature.67 
New York is, therefore, in the minority in treating professional licenses 
as marital assets, dividing their value between spouses as appropriate.68  
Other jurisdictions may grant the nonprofessional spouse certain relief in 
limited circumstances.  If, for example, the husband single-handedly sup-
ported the household during his wife’s law school years, he may receive 
reimbursement alimony.69 
 
62. See generally, e.g., Young v. Young, No. CA 07-540, 2008 WL 588601 (Ark. Ct. App. 
2008); Culver v. Culver, Nos. 2002-CA-001109-MR, 2002-CA-001221-MR, 2004 WL 103024 
(Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2004); McHargue v. McHargue, 162 N.C.App. 722 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004); 
Lambert v. Lambert, No. 2004-P-0057, 2005 WL 1075737 (Ohio Ct. App. May 6, 2005). 
63. Wendt v. Wendt, 757 A.2d 1225, 1230 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000). 
64. See Margaret F. Brinig, Property Distribution Physics:  The Talisman of Time and 
Middle Class Law, 31 FAM. L.Q. 93, 93 (1997). 
65. Such a battle seems of increasing importance for women with professional degrees.  
Professor Robin Fretwell Wilson recently released a study showing that women with business, 
law, or medical school degrees are twice as likely to get divorced or separated as their male 
counterparts. Sara Schaefer Munoz, Study Finds Women’s MBAs Hazardous to Marital Health, 
WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 2008, http://blogs.wsj.com/juggle/2008/04/02/study-finds-womens-mbas-
hazardous-to-marital-health/?mod=WSJBlog#comment-40588. 
66. PRINCIPLES, supra note 29, § 4.07. 
67. See, e.g., Simmons v. Simmons, 708 A.2d 949, 955 (Conn. 1998). 
68. See, e.g., O’Brien v. O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712, 751 (N.Y. 1985). 
69. See, e.g., Mahoney v. Mahoney, 453 A.2d 527, 536 (N.J. 1982) (holding where one 
spouse received financial contributions from the other, which were used in obtaining a 
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Nonetheless, American courts’ general refusal to divide the value of a 
professional degree underscores their reluctance to apportion marital assets 
between the spouses equally.  The view that the spouse who earned the 
degree solely receives its benefit is, therefore, consistent with the American 
philosophy that the contributing spouse keeps his or her contribution, 
particularly if it is a remarkable one.  Such a result, typical in the United 
States, makes English divorce law the envy of American lower income 
spouses seeking divorces. 
III. THE ENGLISH YARDSTICK OF EQUALITY 
The English statutory framework on post-divorce property division, 
rooted in the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, gives courts significant 
discretion on the issue.70  Although judges initially used this discretion to 
award spouses their reasonable needs and requirements, courts recently 
began to favor an equal property division.  In 2001, this preference culmi-
nated in White v. White, which articulated the yardstick of equality against 
which judges now measure their awards. 
A. THE STATUTORY BASIS FOR ENGLISH DIVORCE LAW 
The English courts’ power to divide marital property upon divorce has 
historically been statutorily prescribed.71  Originally, a judge’s ability to 
order varying settlements between spouses was found in the Matrimonial 
Causes Act 1859, which replaced the old ecclesiastical courts and estab-
lished the Court for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes.72  Owing to its 
patriarchical Victorian roots, however, the 1859 Act limited the courts’ 
ability to award fair settlements to women.73  Under the 1859 Act, women 
also lacked men’s ability to exercise claims against a spouse for adultery, 
cruelty, or desertion that led to divorce.74  These limitations on the English 
judiciary led the Law Commission to eventually seek reform, resulting in 
the current legal regime under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, which 
provides judges with significant discretion in developing an approach to 
post-divorce property divisions.75 
 
professional degree or license with the expectation of deriving material benefits for both spouses, 
the supporting spouse may be reimbursed for the amount of such contributions). 
70. Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973, c. 18. 
71. For a brief but useful history of English statutory divorce law on property division, see 
White v. White, [2001] 1 A.C. 596 (H.L.) [17-20] (appeal taken from Eng.). 
72. Id. at [17]. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973, c. 18. 
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1. The Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 
The Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (Act) constitutes the primary legis-
lation underpinning divorce law in the United Kingdom.  The most clearly 
articulated principle in the Act is the due regard courts must have for the 
children of the marriage.  Specifically, section 25(2) provides that children 
must be placed in the financial position they would have enjoyed had the 
marriage not ended.76  In big money cases, this provision is less relevant 
because of the abundance of money involved. 
The Act is not as lucid, however, on the financial arrangement of the 
spouses following divorce.77  Sections 23 and 24 allow the courts to make 
financial provision and property adjustment orders.  The Act also contains a 
checklist guiding the court’s power in dividing the property between divor-
cing spouses.78  However, the Act does not provide any guidance on the 
objectives of post-divorce property division; the section of the Act that 
 
76. Id. § 25(3).  The relevant provisions consider: 
(a) the financial needs of the child; 
(b) the income, earning capacity (if any), property and other financial resources 
of the child; 
(c) any physical or mental disability of the child; 
(d) the manner in which he was being and in which the parties to the marriage 
expected him to be educated or trained . . . . 
Id. § 25(3). 
77. As Judge Lord Nicholls declared, “The Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 confers wide 
discretionary powers on the courts over all the property of the husband and wife.” White, 1 A.C. 
596 at [2]. 
78. Id. at [21].  The exact checklist in the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 guiding property 
division is: 
(a) the income, earning capacity, property and other financial resources which 
each of the parties to the marriage has or is likely to have in the foreseeable 
future . . . 
(b) the financial needs, obligations and responsibilities which each of the parties 
to the marriage has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future; 
(c) the standard of living enjoyed by the family before the breakdown of the 
marriage; 
(d) the age of each party to the marriage and the duration of the marriage; 
(e) any physical or mental disability of either of the parties to the marriage; 
(f) the contributions which each of the parties has made or is likely in the 
foreseeable future to make to the welfare of the family, including any 
contribution made by looking after the home or caring for the family; 
. . . . 
(h) in the case of proceedings for divorce or nullity of marriage, the value to 
either of the parties to the marriage of any benefit [for example, a pension] 
which, by reason of the dissolution or annulment of the marriage, that party will 
lose the chance of acquiring. 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, c. 18, § 25(2). 
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originally provided such guidance was removed.79  That section had man-
dated that judges exercise their discretion so: 
[A]s to place the parties, so far as it is practicable, and having re-
gard to their conduct, just to do so, in the financial position in 
which they would have been if the marriage had not broken down 
and each had properly discharged his or her financial obligations 
and responsibilities towards the other.80 
With the deletion of this provision, no explicit objective of post-divorce 
property division exists within the Act.  Its closest indication is another 
section of the Act, section 10, which requires that “the financial provision 
made by the petitioner for the respondent is reasonable and fair or the best 
that can be made in the circumstances.”81  Courts have also read section 
25A as advocating a clean break between the parties. 
Although the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 mentions fairness in 
property division, it is not mandated as the lone or even primary goal of 
property awards.82  Nonetheless, the English courts have particularly valued 
fairness as an objective of property division in the absence of explicit 
statutory guidance.  As Judge Nicholls opined: 
Implicitly, the objective must be to achieve a fair outcome.  The 
purpose of these powers is to enable the court to make fair finan-
cial arrangements on or after divorce in the absence of agreement 
between the former spouses . . . .  The powers must always be 
exercised with this objective in view . . . .83 
Despite its ambiguities, the Act is the primary statutory element to 
English divorce law.  As one English judge declared, “Matrimonial Causes 
1973 . . . rules the day.  And despite the endless judicial gloss which is 
applied to it year in and year out at every level it is always best to start and 
end in that familiar section.”84  Given the significant judicial discretion 
allowed by the Act, however, much divorce law has evolved through the 
case law.  Not wholly in favor of the consequent direction of English 
divorce law, the Law Commission has proposed legislative changes through 
the Family Act 1996. 
 
79. White, 1 A.C. 596 at [23]. 
80. Id. (quoting the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act, 1970, c. 45, § 5(1) 
[repealed]). 
81. Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973, c. 18, § 10(3)(b). 
82. Id. 
83. White, 1 A.C. 596 at [23] (citation omitted). 
84. Charman v. Charman, [2006] EWHC (Fam) 1879, [58] (appeal taken from Eng.). 
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2. The Family Act 1996 
Drafted by the Law Commission, the Family Act 1996 (Family Act) 
was delayed in its complete enactment.85  Nonetheless, the Commission, a 
catalyst and guiding force for legal change in England, has often influenced 
the divorce law.  Thus, it is prudent to be mindful of its recommendations in 
considering English divorce law today. 
Specifically, Part II of the Family Act introduces new divorce law.86  
Part III focuses on publicly-funded mediation, a topic less relevant to ancil-
lary relief.87  Importantly, however, Part I of the Family Act establishes 
several principles, the lack of which had characterized divorce law since 
1973, when the Commission formulated the Matrimonial Causes Act.  
These principles are found in section 1 of the Act and direct the courts to 
execute all divorce law in light of these principles.88 
Most notably, the overarching principle is the institution of marriage 
must be supported.  Stated differently, “[D]ivorce law must not undermine 
the institution of marriage.”89  The courts, therefore, gain the obligation to 
apply divorce law so as to respect and support marriage.  Accordingly, the 
Family Act includes provisions designed to hinder divorces, such as cooling 
off periods before a divorce can be granted.90 
Commentators have noted that the principle of respect for marriage 
conflicts with some of the incentives provided by a divorce law that favors 
equal property division, as English law currently does.  First, in big money 
 
85. Family Law Act, 1996, c. 27; GILLIAN DOUGLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO FAMILY LAW 
184 (2d ed. 2004). 
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
88. The exact principles are as follows: 
(a) that the institution of marriage is to be supported; 
(b) that the parties to a marriage which may have broken down are to be 
encouraged to take all practicable steps, whether by marriage counseling or 
otherwise, to save the marriage; 
(c) that a marriage which has irretrievably broken down and is being brought to 
an end should be brought to an end— 
(i) with minimum distress to the parties and to the children affected; 
(ii) with questions dealt with in a manner designed to promote as good a 
continuing relationship between the parties and any children affected as is 
possible in the circumstances; and 
(iii) without costs being unreasonably incurred in connection with the 
procedures to be followed in bringing the marriage to an end; and 
(d) that any risk to one of the parties to a marriage, and to any children, of 
violence from the other party should, so far as reasonably practicable, be 
removed or diminished. 
Family Law Act, 1996, c. 27, § 1. 
89. DOUGLAS, supra note 85, at 185. 
90. Family Law Act, 1996, c. 27, § 1(b). 
       
2010] ALL’S FAIR IN LOVE AND WAR 131 
cases, an equal property division creates a disincentive for the higher in-
come spouse to marry, not only because of the risk of losing significant 
assets upon divorce, but also because the laws governing marriage may 
unpredictably shift again, as illustrated by the dramatic changes in English 
divorce law that resulted in a preference for an equal division91—and pre-
marital agreements are hardly a perfect solution.92  Second, if married, 
people’s incentive for professional productivity may be reduced by the 
prospect of equal property division upon divorce.93  Moreover, a promise of 
equal division incentivizes spouses’ litigiousness because the lower income 
spouse will not settle for less than an equal division, while higher income 
spouses may view such a division as unfair.94  Finally, any formulaic divi-
sion, even if creating dissatisfaction, simplifies the divorce process, perhaps 
easing a couple’s decision to divorce.  In any case, however, the English 
statutory framework continues to provide judges with significant discretion 
in property divisions, allowing judges to formulate divorce law relatively 
unfettered.95  Accordingly, the courts’ interpretation of the statutory frame-
work is the most determinative factor of English divorce law today. 
B. JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF ENGLISH DIVORCE LAW 
One of the consequences, and perhaps advantages, of vesting discretion 
in the English judiciary instead of Parliament is that legal change might be 
easier to accomplish.96  Judicial discretion has indeed allowed the courts to 
 
91. As one embattled higher income spouse commented, “There is a genuine sense of griev-
ance among rich husbands that they married, in this case in 1976, with the law as it then was, and 
are now facing a sea-change wrought in 2000.” Frances Gibb, “I Didn’t Want to Take Him for 
Every Penny—I’m Not Greedy,” THE TIMES (London), May 25, 2007, at News 5.  On the other 
hand, the prospect of an equal property division may discourage the higher income-earner from 
divorcing. 
92. For one, they are not legally enforceable in England. See infra Part IV.D. 
93. See Rebecca Bailey-Harris, The Paradoxes of Principle and Pragmatism:  Ancillary 
Relief in England and Wales, 19 INT’L J.L. & POL’Y & FAM. 229, 235 (2005).  An objective 
valuation of spouses’ marital contributions may alleviate this problem. See infra notes 176-79 and 
accompanying text. 
94. On the other hand, significant judicial discretion may also fuel litigation if the parties 
perceive the award as unfair, particularly when the property division is very disproportionate. See 
supra Parts II.A., II.C. 
95. See generally Burgess v. Burgess, [1996] 2 F.L.R. 34; Calderbank v. Calderbank, [1976] 
Fam. 93; Dart v. Dart, [1996] Fam. 607; Daubney v. Daubney, [1976] Fam. 267; Fitzpatrick v. 
Sterling Hous. Ass’n Ltd., [1999] UKHL 42, [2001] 1 A.C. 27 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.); 
O’Donnell v. O’Donnell, [1976] Fam. 83; P v. P, [1978] 1 W.L.R. 483; Page v. Page, [1981] 2 
F.L.R. 198; Piglowska v. Piglowski, [1999] UKHL 27, [1999] 3 All E.R. 632 (H.L.) (appeal taken 
from Eng.); Preston v. Preston, [1982] Fam. 17; Trippas v. Trippas [1973] Fam. 134; Haldane v. 
Haldane, [1977] 2 NZLR 715 (P.C.). 
96. But see Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 93 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I think it 
obvious . . . that we will be ushering in a new regime of judicially prescribed, and federally 
prescribed, family law.  I have no reason to believe that federal judges will be better at this than 
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develop and calibrate divorce law, albeit at the expense of predictability.  In 
any divorce case before the courts, however, “[o]ne question always arises.  
It concerns how the property of the husband and wife should be divided and 
whether one of them should continue to support the other.”97  This problem 
becomes especially complex in big money cases. 
Endowed with statutorily prescribed discretion,98 English judges have 
therefore formulated the objectives of divorce law and selected the appro-
priate model of property division.99  Guided by fairness, English judges 
have also developed the legal standards by which to divide property follow-
ing divorce, although their jurisprudence recently developed in favor of 
equal division.100  This preference arises not only in average divorce cases 
where such a division is unavoidable by virtue of limited assets, but also in 
big money cases, wherein one spouse far out-contributed the other and the 
lower income spouse’s needs are comfortably met by a smaller fraction of 
the assets.101 
1. Reasonable Needs and Reasonable Requirements 
Prior to White in 2001, English courts frequently awarded lower 
income spouses only their reasonable needs and reasonable requirements, 
which no doubt often overlapped.  Page v. Page102 articulated the factors to 
be considered in both a “requirements” and a “needs” division: “In a case 
such as this ‘needs’ can be regarded as equivalent to ‘reasonable require-
ments’, taking into account the other factors such as age, health, length of 
marriage and standard of living.”103  The interpretation of needs and 
requirements was tweaked over the years as English judges sought fair 
property divisions.104  For example, the phrase “reasonable requirements” 
 
state legislatures; and state legislatures have the great advantages of doing harm in a more 
circumscribed area, of being able to correct their mistakes in a flash, and of being removable by 
the people.”). 
97. White v. White, [2001] 1 A.C. 596 (H.L.) [1] (appeal taken from Eng.). 
98. Cf. Matrimonial Property Act 1976 (N.Z.) (prescribing detailed instructions for the 
division of property following divorce). 
99. See also discussion infra Part IV.B. 
100. See discussion infra Part III.B.2. 
101. See id. 
102. [1981] 2 F.L.R. 198. 
103. Id. at 201.  The view that reasonable requirements equaled reasonable needs was 
acknowledged in White v. White, [2001] 1 A.C. 596 (H.L.) [30] (appeal taken from Eng.) 
(quoting Preston v. Preston, [1982] Fam. 17) (“[T]he word ‘needs’ in section 25(1)(b) [of the 
Matrimonial Causes Act] in relation to the other provisions in the subsection is equivalent to 
‘reasonable requirements,’ having regard to the other factors and the objective set by the 
concluding words of the subsection . . . .”). 
104. See FRANCES BURTON, FAMILY LAW 159 (2003) (discussing the meaning of reasonable 
needs and requirements under English law). 
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was employed in O’Donnell v. O’Donnell,105 where the wife received more 
than she strictly needed.  Dart v. Dart106 also permitted courts to award 
spouses more than their strict needs.  In Dart, Lord Justice Thorpe reiter-
ated the factors to determine property division included available assets, the 
household’s former standard of living, the spouses’ health and age, each 
party’s contributions to the marriage, and the length of the marriage.107 
In big money cases, however, lower income spouses were often able to 
receive a significant windfall by claiming, as reasonable requirements, 
massive awards for exorbitant clothing stipends and other matters extending 
well beyond necessity.108  Nonetheless, the reasonable requirements 
approach in effect capped the amount a spouse could receive, to the 
dissatisfaction of the House of Lords.  Specifically, the lower income 
spouses could not easily share in the marital assets because they were limit-
ed by their reasonable requirements.  According to Lord Nicholls, “This 
seems then to have led to a practice whereby the court’s appraisal of a 
claimant wife’s reasonable requirements has been treated as a determina-
tive, and limiting, factor on the amount of the award which should be made 
in her favour.”109 
The reasonable requirements standard, therefore, began to encounter 
criticism in English law.  For example, Lord Nicholls suggested in White 
that the standard departed from the statutory language of the Matrimonial 
Causes Act.110  In another case, however, the reasonable requirements stan-
dard was practically scorned as being too generous: 
The husband is genuinely bemused that the wife should regard his 
£20m offer as anything other than reasonable, even generous 
[given that the wealth was generated entirely by his efforts] . . . .  
In the narrow, old fashioned sense that perspective is understand-
able if somewhat anachronistic.  Nowadays it must attract little 
sympathy.111 
Without an accepted standard of property division, however, English courts 
lacked guidance in such cases.  The House of Lords provided renewed 
 
105. [1976] Fam. 83. 
106. [1996] Fam. 607. 
107. Id.  These factors are similar to those requiring consideration under the American equit-
able distribution principle in states such as Illinois and Connecticut. See supra note 24 and 
accompanying text. 
108. In the highly emotional context of divorce, some spouses may avenge a divorce by 
claiming exorbitant requirements. See, e.g., Katherine A. Kinser & R. Scott Downing, Family Law 
Issues That Impact the Professional Athlete, 15 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 337, 361 (1998). 
109. White v. White, [2001] 1 A.C. 596 (H.L.) [31] (appeal taken from Eng.). 
110. Id. at [35]. 
111. Charman v. Charman, [2006] EWHC (Fam) 1879, [19] (appeal taken from Eng.). 
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direction in White v. White, which adopted a yardstick of equality in 
property division. 
2. Adoption of the Yardstick of Equality:  White v. White 
White is the landmark recent case that introduced a strong preference 
for equal property division in English divorces.  The facts of the case were 
relatively straightforward:  Mr. and Mrs. White married in 1961.112  They 
both had farming backgrounds and throughout their marriage ran a success-
ful dairy farming business in partnership.113  Their farm, Blagroves Farm, 
generated marital assets of £3.5 million through its live and dead stock, 
machinery, and milk quota.114  Mr. and Mrs. White also farmed Rexton 
Farm, located ten miles away from Blagroves Farm and worth £1.25 mil-
lion, as part of their partnership business.115  Additionally, the couple had 
three children.116  The marriage broke down in 1994, and the spouses 
divorced in 1997.117  At the time of divorce, the net worth of Mr. and Mrs. 
White’s assets totaled £4.6 million, £193,300 of which was owned solely by 
Mrs. White and mostly in the form of pension provisions, and £193,300 of 
which was owned solely by Mr. White and mostly in Rexton Farm.118 
The lower court proceeded on a “clean break basis,” in accordance with 
section 25A of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, as well as with due 
regard for Mrs. White’s reasonable needs.119  Mrs. White had argued her 
reasonable needs included sufficient money to start her own farm.120  How-
ever, the judge deemed this request to be unreasonable, determining it 
unjustifiable to fragment the existing, successful farming business so that 
Mrs. White could begin her own farm without any guarantees.121  Calcu-
lating the wife’s reasonable needs without her requested capital for a new 
farm, the judge granted her a fifth of the £4.6 million marital assets.122 
Mrs. White appealed, and the court of appeal increased her share to 
two-fifths because she had been Mr. White’s equal partner in the farming 
business.123  In the course of its judgment, the court of appeal opined the 
 
112. White, 1. A.C. 596 at [4]. 
113. Id. at [5]. 
114. Id. at [6]. 
115. Id. at [7]. 
116. Id. at [4]. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. at [8]. 
119. Id. at [9] (internal quotations omitted). 
120. Id. at [10]. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. at [8-9]. 
123. Id. at [11]. 
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starting point should be to divide the assets according to partnership 
principles—here, the spouses were equal business partners.124  Additionally, 
the court noted there should be an increase in Mrs. White’s share to account 
for her contributions as a wife and mother.125  Both spouses appealed:  Mrs. 
White demanded exactly half of the marital property, and Mr. White sought 
the reinstatement of the lower court’s award.126 
The House of Lords accepted the appeal and handed down its water-
shed decision, which altered the direction of big money cases.  Lord 
Nicholls first rejected the necessity of detailing the partnership stakes be-
tween the spouses, instead underscoring that a broad review of their finan-
cial situation was more appropriate.127  Second, and more importantly, Lord 
Nicholls declared a principle of equality between husband and wife that was 
independent of their exact shares in the business.128 
However, the House of Lords stopped short of creating a presumption 
of equality in property division so as to refrain from offending the inten-
tions of Parliament, whose members had not included such a presumption 
in the legislation,129 as their Scottish counterparts had.130  Instead, Lord 
Nicholls formulated a yardstick of equality against which judges should 
check their property division decisions.131  This represented a break from 
the previous reasonable needs and requirements standard. 
Notably, White is an unusual case to change the direction of English 
big money cases because it is factually atypical in that there is no higher 
income spouse.  On the contrary, both spouses were nearly equal partners in 
the business.  To begin the farm, each contributed approximately an equal 
amount of capital.132  Eventually, Mr. White’s father favorably loaned them 
some additional business capital, although both spouses worked together to 
expand and farm the land.133  The whole business was treated as the 
property of the partnership between Mr. and Mrs. White.  In addition to her 
 
124. Id. at [14]. 
125. Id. at [11]. 
126. Id. at [11-12]. 
127. Id. at [11].  Cf. supra note 23 and accompanying text (likening equitable distribution to 
partnership dissolution). 
128. White, 1 A.C. 596 at [28]. 
129. See supra Part III.A. 
130. White, 1 A.C. 596 at [27]. 
131. Id. at [25].  Lord Cooke, in his concurring opinion, doubted whether there was much 
distinction between “yardstick” and “guidelines” or “starting point.” Id. at [59].  However, the 
House of Lords was concerned that White could create a formal presumption of equality in 
practice, with the attendant consequences regarding the burden of proof. Id. at [26]. 
132. Id. at [5]. 
133. Id. 
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farming duties, Mrs. White also primarily maintained the household.134  
Nonetheless, this atypical case—with equal income-earning spouses—
changed the direction of all big money cases, even when one spouse con-
tributed most, if not all, of the marital wealth.  White therefore allowed the 
courts to divide marital assets equally, even if the award exceeded the most 
imaginative reasonable needs or requirements of the lower income spouse.  
Therefore, an entrepreneurial high income spouse could no longer provide 
just for his or her ex-spouse’s reasonable requirements, no matter how 
lavish, but now had to provide the ex-spouse with an equal share of wealth. 
Furthermore, despite its particularities, White influenced the future of 
not only big money cases, but also of those involving moderate marital 
assets.135  Specifically, Lord Nicholls announced a “principle of universal 
application” that the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 authorized: 
In seeking to achieve a fair outcome, there is no place for discrim-
ination between husband and wife and their respective roles.  
Typically, a husband and wife share the activities of earning mon-
ey, running their home and caring for their children.  Traditionally, 
the husband earned the money, and the wife looked after the home 
and the children.  This traditional division of labour is no longer 
the order of the day.  Frequently both parents work.  Sometimes it 
is the wife who is the money-earner, and the husband runs the 
home and cares for the children during the day.  But whatever the 
division of labour chosen by the husband and wife, or forced upon 
them by circumstances, fairness requires that this should not preju-
dice or advantage either party when considering . . . the parties’ 
contributions.136 
Accordingly, the yardstick of equality applies to all divorce cases, not just 
big money cases.  However, its fairness is questioned most by higher 
income spouses in big money cases, where there is a significant difference 
 
134. Id. at [14]. 
135. See generally, e.g., Adams v. Lewis, [2001] All E.R. (D) 274; Elliott v. Elliot, [2000] 
EWCA (Civ) 407.  The Annual Review of the All England Law Reports noted: 
In a previous edition of this Review, it was suggested that modern marriages may 
sometimes be described as an equal partnership, but that the Court of Appeal’s 
decision in White v. White demonstrated that some marriages are more equal than 
others.  The decision of the House of Lords [in White v. White] now establishes a 
principle of equality for all marriages. 
Family Law, 2001 ALL ENGLAND LAW REPORTS ANNUAL REVIEW 219, 219 (2001) (citations 
omitted). 
136. White, 1 A.C. 596 at [24]. 
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between the lower income spouse’s reasonable contributions and half of the 
marital property.137 
Unsurprisingly, White’s dramatic shift toward equal division has en-
countered criticism.  For one, the court wrote White with a broad stroke, not 
providing many instructive details to practitioners.138  As a commentator 
noted, “[S]hould the yardstick apply only to capital division or to future 
income as well?”139  Furthermore, the White decision threatened to produce 
unpredictable and confusing case law due to its break from precedent.  
Notwithstanding these criticisms, the yardstick of equality is favored by the 
House of Lords as a justification for equal division, transforming England 
into one of the friendliest divorce forums for lower income spouses and 
creating a doctrinal split from American divorce law. 
3. The Special Contributions Exception 
To avoid harsh results, the yardstick of equality has a special contri-
butions exception.140  This doctrine allows courts to take into account one 
spouse’s unique contribution to the marriage, resulting in a higher award to 
that spouse.141  However, the doctrine of special contributions is not often 
used by English courts. 
The doctrine is difficult to apply because English judges have become 
uncomfortable with evaluating the parties’ contributions to the marriage.  
Originally, big money divorce cases were couched in terms such as the 
exceptional or “stellar” contributions of one party.142  The use of such 
terminology eventually decreased because of judges’ uneasiness in valuing 
 
137. See infra Part IV.A. 
138. Family Law, supra note 135, at 219 (“The decision of the House of Lords [in White v. 
White] now establishes a principle of equality for all marriages.  In principle, this is a welcome 
development.  However, in the light of the uncertainty about the implications of the case, Dr. 
Stephen Cretney asks:  ‘Was it not a trifle rash for the House of Lords to overrule . . . the hitherto 
tolerably well-settled practice of the courts?’” (citation omitted)). 
139. Bailey-Harris, supra note 93, at 234-35.  See also supra note 9. 
140. Cf. Wendt v. Wendt, No. FA96 0149562 S., 1998 WL 161165, at *225 (Conn. Super. 
Ct. Mar. 31, 1998).  Short marriages may also justify a disproportionate division in England.  “The 
general approach in this type of case should be to consider whether, and to what extent, there is 
good reason for departing from equality.  As already indicated, in short marriage cases there will 
often be a good reason for departing substantially from equality with regard to non-matrimonial 
property.” Miller v. Miller & McFarlane v. McFarlane, [2006] UKHL 24, [2006] 2 A.C. 618 [55] 
(appeal taken from Eng.). 
141. Parkinson explains: 
The doctrine of special contributions provides that a court is justified in evaluating the 
contributions of spouses during the course of the marriage as unequal where the 
performance of one spouse in his or her role within the marriage has special features 
about it, placing that contribution outside of the norm. 
Parkinson, supra note 6, at 164. 
142. See, e.g., Cowan v. Cowan, [2001] EWCA (Civ.) 679, [2002] Fam. 97. 
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each party’s contributions to a marriage, particularly when one spouse was 
in the corporate world and the other was a homemaker.  As one English 
judge suggested:  “But then, the facts having been established, they each 
call for a value judgment of the worth of each side’s behaviour and transla-
tion of that worth into actual money.  But by what measure and using what 
criteria?”143  Thus, the courts’ uneasiness with disproportionate property 
division has, to a certain extent, undermined the special contributions 
doctrine. 
Even when a judge applies the special contribution doctrine, the final 
property division rarely differs much from an equal split.  For example, in 
one of the most recent big money cases in England, Charman v. 
Charman,144 the special contributions doctrine failed to produce a substan-
tially proportionate division.145  In fact, during the course of that lengthy 
litigation, Mrs. Charman conceded not to pursue a share greater than forty-
five percent if a pending case, Miller, upheld the special contribution 
doctrine.146  Ultimately, the court awarded Mrs. Charman thirty-six percent 
of the marital assets, totaling a £48 million award—one of the largest in 
British history.147  She received this award even after her ex-husband pro-
vided her with the marital home, substantial provisions for their sons, and 
accommodation for her parents.148 
Furthermore, in Sorrell v. Sorrell,149 an English court similarly nar-
rowed the special contributions doctrine’s influence, finding a departure 
from equality justified by the husband’s special contribution to the marriage 
in the form of exceptional business talent amounting to genius.150  Despite 
her husband’s brilliant financial contributions to the marriage, the wife was 
awarded forty percent of the assets.151  Finally, in GW v. RW,152 the court 
concluded “some departure from equality in the instant case was justified 
on the basis of the duration of the marriage.”153  Once again, the wife was 
 
143. G v. G, [2002] EWHC (Fam) 1339, [34], 2 F.L.R. 1143, 1155.  See also Lambert v. 
Lambert, [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1685, [2003] Fam. 103 (noting the “breadwinner” does not 
necessarily contribute more to the household); Norris v. Norris & Haskins v. Haskins, [2003] 
EWCA (Civ) 1084.  See also infra Part IV.C. 
144. [2006] EWHC (Fam) 1879. 
145. Charman, [2006] EWHC (Fam) 1879 at [127]. 
146. Id. at [13]. 
147. Frances Gibb, Legal Process in Dock as Judges Rule Ex-Wife Is Worth Record £48 
Million Payout, THE TIMES (London), May 25, 2007, at News 4. 
148. Id. 
149. [2005] EWHC (Fam) 1717. 
150. Id. at [2]. 
151. Id. at [118]. 
152. [2003] EWHC (Fam) 611. 
153. Id. at [1]. 
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awarded forty percent, illustrating that post-White property division often 
resembles an approximately equal split despite the special contributions 
doctrine.154 
Thus, while the doctrine of special contributions may exempt a higher 
income earner from an equal division in theory, many English courts have 
restricted its use.  Even if one spouse’s special contribution is acknowl-
edged by the courts, the final division does not fall far from an equal divi-
sion in big money cases, even when such a sum exceeds the most imagina-
tive reasonable requirements held by the lower income spouse.  Such a 
result differs significantly from the previous outcomes produced under the 
measures of reasonable needs and reasonable requirements.  The current 
state of English law, unfavorable to higher income spouses, provides 
several important lessons to American courts. 
IV. LESSONS FROM A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
American federalism is often praised for creating the experimental con-
ditions that advance the most efficient solutions.155  The commonalities 
between English and American divorce law, which readily facilitate com-
parison, also create the experimental conditions that invaluably illuminate 
the various approaches to family law.  The similarities between England 
and the United States in property division are striking.  First, both systems 
routinely resolve divorce cases with similar fact and issue patterns.  Second, 
each jurisdiction’s statutory divorce law is fundamentally similar to the 
others.  Third, both judicial systems are bound by divorce legislation pro-
viding a substantial amount of judicial discretion, which is particularly true 
in the majority of American states that utilize equitable distribution as the 
default property regime.  Finally, both jurisdictions strive toward the shared 
goal of fairness in property division. 
Despite these fundamental similarities, however, English courts have 
diverged from the majority of American states by embracing equal division.  
The result of this doctrinal divergence is most noticeable in big money 
cases, heightening the opportunity for a comparison of the two approaches, 
as well as their merits and consequences.  Such a comparison is indeed 
revealing.  First, the English courts’ preference for equal division offers a 
different judicial interpretation of fairness.  Second, isolating the reasons 
 
154. Id. 
155. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“One of 
federalism’s chief virtues, of course, is that it promotes innovation by allowing for the possibility 
that ‘a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel 
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.’”) (citing New State Ice 
Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
       
140 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 86:115 
for England’s equal distribution scheme—the courts’ apparent discomfort 
in evaluating the spouses’ contributions to a marriage—suggests alterna-
tives for achieving property divisions that better reflect the parties’ 
contributions to a marriage.  Finally, these issues necessarily implicate the 
acceptance and use of premarital agreements in the United States, as well as 
in England, where such agreements are currently undergoing added scrutiny 
in preparation for potential legislative changes. 
A. THE MEANING OF FAIRNESS 
A comparison of the American and English approaches to post-divorce 
property division immediately reveals that, in this context, no universal 
definition of fairness exists.  The mere fact that different statutory ap-
proaches exist in the United States,156 and an entirely different system has 
developed in England, illustrates the elusive nature of fairness, as well as 
the differing meanings of fairness across jurisdictions.157 
Although the articulated goal of English property division may be 
fairness, the courts have continued searching for the best method to achieve 
it.  As Lord Nicholls noted, “fairness, like beauty, lies in the eye of the 
beholder.”158  Divorce law has, therefore, changed as quickly as the concept 
of fairness, inherently jeopardizing fairness by increasing the law’s unpre-
dictability despite people’s reliance on it. 
Furthermore, the English courts’ separate classification of big money 
divorce cases may conflict with a fundamental understanding of fairness.  It 
is difficult to think of another area of law where the definition of fairness 
depends on the amount of money involved, which would generally be con-
sidered unfair.  Nonetheless, as one English court noted: 
There may be cases of short marriages where the limited financial 
resources of the parties necessarily mean that attention will still 
have to be focused on the parties’ needs.  That is not so in big 
money cases.  Then the court is concerned to decide what would 
be a fair division of the whole of the assets, taking into account the 
parties’ respective financial needs and any need for 
compensation.159 
 
156. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.  See also supra Part II.B. 
157. In the case of mobile couples, this has many implications in the field of conflicts of law, 
or the problem of which law to apply when more than one jurisdiction is involved. 
158. White v. White, [2001] 1 A.C. 596 (H.L.) [1] (appeal taken from Eng.). 
159. Miller v. Miller & McFarlane v. McFarlane, [2006] UKHL 24, [55], [2006] 2 A.C. 618 
(appeal taken from Eng.). 
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In other words, the courts’ perception of fairness plays a lesser role in the 
average divorce case because there is no use for discretion with limited 
assets.  However, while big money divorce cases may certainly present 
particular challenges to English courts, it may be inherently unfair to treat 
them differently than the remainder of divorce cases. 
Finally, the yardstick of equality approach of the English courts 
produces property awards that highly depend on the amount of money at 
stake, which may produce unfair results.  Under the English approach, for 
example, a homemaker married to an average-earning spouse will receive a 
tiny fraction of a wealthy homemaker’s award, even though they both 
performed the same work.160  Therefore, what may be a fair settlement for 
an average-earning couple becomes an unfair award if applied to a big 
money case.  It may be fairer across divorce cases, however, to use a more 
objective valuation of each spouse’s marital contribution.161 
In practice, many of these issues of fairness implicate only big money 
cases.  In the average English divorce case, applying the yardstick of 
equality to property division would have a result similar to that under a 
reasonable needs approach because of the modesty of the divisible assets—
half of these would not exceed the spouse’s reasonable needs.  In big 
money cases, however, there is necessarily a significant difference between 
the lower income spouse’s reasonable needs and half of all divisible 
property—raising the important question of which approach produces a 
fairer result. 
This same observation applies to the American system, which remains 
split between the community property and equitable distribution 
approaches.  In the average American divorce case, there may not be much 
practical difference between community property and equitable distribution.  
However, when the assets are sizable, the results differ greatly depending 
on which approach the court uses in dividing the property.  In sum, fairness 
acquires different meanings depending on the amount of money at stake and 
the particular court’s approach.  The English courts have been laboring in 
recent years to more precisely develop these nuances of fairness, but the 
emerging question for the American judicial system is whether the English 
approach produces fair results. 
B. THE VARIETY OF PROPERTY MODELS 
In the United States, while courts aim to achieve fairness in property 
divisions, they must work within the legislative framework mandating 
 
160. This assumes the two homemakers contributed equally to their households. 
161. See infra notes 176-79 and accompanying text. 
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either equitable distribution or community property.162  English courts, 
meanwhile, must determine which property model to utilize, within White’s 
framework.  Therefore, in addition to divergent perceptions of fairness, the 
choice of property model or regime influences the results of the property 
division because each model compensates the lower income spouse 
differently.163 
Adopted by a minority of American states and many European civil 
law systems, one possible property regime is community property.164  This 
model rests on the assumption that marriage is a partnership of equals,165 
resulting in relatively equal shares upon divorce.166  As Lord Nicholls of 
Birkenhead opined, “The parties commit themselves to sharing their lives.  
They live and work together.  When their partnership ends each is entitled 
to an equal share of the assets of the partnership, unless there is a good 
reason to the contrary.”167 
Another option is equitable distribution, wherein the equality between 
spouses does not necessarily result in an equal sharing of assets at divorce, 
but property division must be equitable.168  Specifically, the shares are 
determined by factors such as the particular needs of one party or the 
children.169  The majority of American states have a statutory default of 
equitable distribution. 
 
162. See supra Parts II, IV.A. 
163. “Property models” will also be referred to as “property regimes” in this Part. 
164. France, Italy, and Poland are examples of European countries wherein the default 
property division is some form of community property. KATHARINA BOELE-WOELKI, MATRI-
MONIAL PROPERTY LAW FROM A COMPARATIVE LAW PERSPECTIVE 5 (2000); Elzbieta 
Skowronska-Bocian, Family and Succession Law, in INTRODUCTION TO POLISH LAW 85, 96-98 
(Stanisław Frankowski ed., 2005).  Community property is the default approach in only a minority 
of American states, which currently consist of Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, 
New Mexico, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. See generally Jeffrey G. Sherman, Prenuptial 
Agreements:  A New Reason to Revive an Old Rule, 53 CLEVELAND L. REV. 359, 370 (2005-2006) 
(discussing the community property regime in the nine community property states).  See also, e.g., 
CAL. FAM. CODE § 2550-56 (West 2007). 
165. See DOUGLAS, supra note 85, at 191-92. 
166. See WILLIAM Q. DE FUNIAK & MICHAEL J. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY 
PROPERTY § 1 (2d ed. 1971). 
167. Miller v. Miller & McFarlane v. McFarlane, [2006] UKHL 24, [16], [2006] 2 A.C. 618 
(appeal taken from Eng.). 
168. See supra Part II.A.  As one higher income spouse’s attorney argued, “The most impor-
tant principle which emerges is the identification of the function of the court as being to ascertain 
the reasonable requirements of the claimant.  If the needs of both parties are satisfied and there is a 
surplus it should lie where it falls.” White v. White, [2001] 1 A.C. 596 (H.L.) [1] (appeal taken 
from Eng.). 
169. Miller, 2 A.C. 618 at [142].  See also H v. H, [2007] EWCH (Fam) 459, [2007] All E.R. 
(D) 88.  However, White emphasized equal division of marital assets is both feasible and fair in 
many situations today. See Burgess v. Burgess, [1996] 2 F.L.R. 34 (allowing a doctor and a lawyer 
to equally share marital assets because both parties had sufficient incomes to supplement their 
halves of the assets); White, 1 A.C. 596 at [143]. 
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A compensation model of property division aims to compensate 
spouses for their contributions to the marriage, as well as their opportunity 
costs of doing so.170  For homemaking spouses, their child-rearing work 
usually composes a substantial amount of total compensation.171  Property 
division may also be driven by the reasonable needs or requirements of the 
parties.172  This model is rooted in the idea marriage generates needs for 
one party that ought to be met by the other party.  This is a common 
approach to property division when there is no financial surplus after the 
parties’ needs are considered. 
English big money divorce cases occasionally exhibit a mixture of 
these two latter models, as McFarlane v. McFarlane173 illustrates.  In that 
case, the House of Lords affirmed the lower courts’ awards, determining 
Mr. McFarlane must meet his ex-wife’s annual needs of £128,000, pay her 
compensation for the marriage-generated disadvantage she incurred by 
quitting her job as an attorney to focus on the family, and pay any surplus 
because she was entitled to share it.  This judgment illustrates the compli-
cations arising in big money property divisions, where the courts must 
untangle vast assets and marital contributions. 
C. VALUATING THE SPOUSAL CONTRIBUTION 
Notably, judicial views on fairness, as well as determinations regarding 
property regimes, are often seemingly driven by a reluctance to value 
spouses’ contributions to a marriage in monetary terms.  English courts in 
particular have been recently troubled by evaluating the homemaker’s 
contribution to the household.174  According to one such judge, “It has . . . 
meant that the court has been asked to examine closely aspects of the psy-
chological dynamic of the marriage partnership in a way nowadays almost 
unheard of.”175  The frequent result of such a view has been that property 
 
170. DOUGLAS, supra note 85, at 191.  See also Ann Laquer Estin, Maintenance, Alimony, 
and the Rehabilitation of Family Care, 71 N.C. L. REV. 721, 750 (1993). 
171. Under this approach, spousal support is based “on the advantages and disadvantages 
flowing from the actual relationship between the parties, rather than from the fact of marriage per 
se.  It attributes financial value to the reasonably held expectations by the spouse who made the 
preponderance of non-monetary contributions or sacrifices that helped the couple achieve their 
marital lifestyle.” Claire L’Heureux-Dube, Equality and the Economic Consequences of Spousal 
Support:  A Canadian Perspective, 7 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 12 (1995). 
172. DOUGLAS, supra note 85, at 191. 
173. [2006] UKHL 24, [2006] 2 A.C. 618 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
174. American courts do not often exhibit this reluctance when applying the equitable 
distribution principle. Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Selective Recognition of Gender Difference in the 
Law:  Revaluing the Caretaker Role, 31 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 1, 35 n.182 (2008). 
175. Charman v. Charman, [2006] EWHC (Fam) 1879, [20] (appeal taken from Eng.). 
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division upon divorce resembles an equal division, even if the spouses 
contributed varying efforts to the marriage. 
The opposite approach would use an economic analysis in divorce 
judgments.  American courts have been exploring this method, utilizing 
traditional human capital theory, market replacement theory, and oppor-
tunity cost theory to reach equitable distribution judgments that reflect 
spouses’ varying efforts.176  There are particular benefits to evaluating 
spouses’ contributions in economic ways.  For one, spouses would be better 
rewarded and compensated for their marital contributions, providing them 
with an incentive to contribute to the marriage in good faith.177  Further-
more, higher income spouses would no longer be compelled into particular 
jobs solely to meet high alimony payments, which often, as a rule, cannot 
be reduced upon self-imposed changes in salary.178  Finally, property 
awards would be more consistent because they would no longer be deter-
mined by the income level of the higher earner, but be established by the 
valuations of each spouse’s marital contributions—whether they be estab-
lished by the court or by the legislature.179  If such valuations were publicly 
available and clear, as well as predictable, then spouses could also weigh 
the differing choices they have in terms of how to contribute to the mar-
riage.  Thus, the advantages of an economic analysis of marital contribu-
tions may prompt American courts to continue exploring this approach in 
order to determine how to achieve the fairest post-divorce property 
divisions. 
D. PREMARITAL AGREEMENTS 
If prospective spouses enter into premarital agreements, such agree-
ments have a potentially vital role in post-divorce property division.180  
 
176. See, e.g., Wendt v. Wendt, No. FA96 0149562 S., 1998 WL 161165, at *25 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. Mar. 31, 1998); Emily Sherwin, Love, Money, and Justice:  Restitution Between 
Cohabitants, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 711, 734 (2006) (“[D]ivorce proceedings have tended to 
become more objective over time.”). 
177. A no-fault divorce property division, on the other hand, provides less incentive to 
behave within marital norms. 
178. American courts in particular base alimony on a formula that combines need and ability 
to pay, although self-imposed salary changes do not lower the alimony obligation. 
179. For example, state legislatures can prescribe formulas, or guidelines, on how to 
calculate each spouse’s marital contribution. 
180. For further background on premarital agreements, see generally Developments in the 
Law—The Law of Marriage and Family, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2075 (2003); Julia Halloran 
McLaughlin, Premarital Agreements and Choice of Law:  “One, Two, Three, Baby, You and Me”, 
72 MO. L. REV. 793 (2007); Karen Servidea, Reviewing Premarital Agreements to Protect the 
State’s Interest in Marriage, 91 VA. L. REV. 535 (2005); Judith T. Younger, Lovers’ Contracts in 
the Courts:  Forsaking the Minimum Decencies, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 349 (2007).  
The premarital agreement is also known as the prenuptial or antenuptial agreement. 
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These agreements essentially allow parties to reduce divorce disputes in the 
future by contracting around judicial and legislative defaults.  Significantly, 
prospective spouses may utilize premarital agreements to define fairness in 
their property division181 and to establish their property model, removing 
the courts and legislatures from those decisions.182  Premarital agreements 
also have the power to predetermine rights and responsibilities not only 
upon the spouses’ divorce or death, but also during their marriage. 
However, premarital agreements are hardly the perfect remedy, 
particularly when their enforceability is in doubt.  In fact, such agreements 
are currently unenforceable in England,183 although courts may consider 
them in determining ancillary relief.184  The Law Commission in England 
launched a major initiative exploring the status and enforceability of pre-
marital agreements on the subject of property and finances, with a report 
and draft bill expected in late 2012.185  In the meantime, the unenforce-
ability of premarital agreements in England may be the reason for their 
rarity among marrying couples,186 although such agreements are increasing 
in popularity.187 
While premarital agreements are more popular in the United States, 
they occasionally raise enforceability issues in court upon divorce.  Prior to 
1970, however, premarital agreements were often considered completely 
invalid in the United States on public policy grounds, as they were deemed 
to endanger marital stability.188  Florida became the first state in the United 
States to accept such agreements in Posner v. Posner.189  Currently, states 
have differing positions on the enforceability of such agreements, with 
some invalidating premarital agreements that are materially unfair to one 
party190 and others exhibiting complete deference to the agreements.191  
 
181. See supra Part IV.A. 
182. See supra Part IV.B. 
183. For a discussion of premarital agreements in France, Germany, Switzerland, and 
Poland, see generally Margaret Ryznar & Anna St pie -Sporek, To Have and to Hold, for Richer 
or Richer:  Premarital Agreements in the Comparative Context, 13 CHAP. L. REV. 27 (2009). 
184. See, e.g., Pre-nuptial and Post-nuptial Agreements, LAW COMMISSION, http://www. 
lawcom.gov.uk/marital_property.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2010). 
185. Id. 
186. One survey found only two percent of married and divorced people in the United 
Kingdom had premarital agreements. Divorce Lawyers Braced for Busiest Week Ever, TIMES 
ONLINE, Jan. 5, 2009, http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/law/article5450552.ece. 
187. More Couples Signing Pre-nuptials, BBC, Sept. 26, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ 
hi/uk_news/8276018.stm (“Family lawyers say they have seen a tenfold increase in recent years in 
couples signing pre-nuptial agreements on dividing their assets after divorce.”). 
188. See Ryznar & St pie -Sporek, supra note 183, at 30. 
189. 233 So.2d 381, 383 (Fla. 1970). 
190. The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act advocates a similar approach. UNIF. 
PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6, 9 U.L.A. 36 (1983). 
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Approximately half of American states, however, have now adopted some 
variation of the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (UPAA).192 
Interestingly, the general theory underpinning premarital agreements 
may undermine the partnership model of marriage, toward which both 
England and the United State strive.  On the one hand, a court’s ability to 
invalidate a contract entered into by equal partners is problematic because 
as equals, they should be able to contract.193  On the other hand, if pre-
marital agreements substantially deprive parties of equal shares, they hinder 
the spouses’ equality.  Some commentators have suggested that premarital 
agreements must move in the direction of dividing property equally, or else 
the agreements are at odds with the view of marriage as a partnership.194  
Accepting this proposition, however, would defeat the entire purpose of a 
premarital agreement, which is to provide parties a method of contracting 
around court defaults. 
Therefore, the favorable treatment of premarital agreements in the 
United States, which permits significant freedom of contract, recognizes 
spousal equality by acknowledging each spouse’s ability to contract.195  
Furthermore, the philosophy pervading American family law acknowledges 
that different people make differing contributions to marital life, thereby 
permitting people to enter into premarital agreements reflecting their 
various contributions.  On the contrary, England’s approach precludes the 
acknowledgment of the differing contributions of spouses, without 
guaranteeing them the contractual freedom to opt-out of such judicial and 
legislative defaults. 
 
191. Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 168 (Pa. 1990). 
192. Charles W. Willey, Effect in Montana of Community-Source Property Acquired in 
Another State (and Its Impact on a Montana Marriage Dissolution, Estate Planning, Property 
Transfers, and Probate), 69 MONT. L. REV. 313, 365 (2008).  For examples of various states’ 
UPAA laws, see CAL. FAM. CODE § 1615 (West 2004), 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/1 (1990), and 
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-17-6 (1956). 
193. Developments in the Law—The Law of Marriage and Family, supra note 180, at 2077. 
194. Id. at 2096.  One article provides: 
This section expands on the argument that deference to freedom of contract in 
antenuptial agreement law is undesirable.  It argues that acknowledgment of the part-
nership conception of marriage demands that parties desiring to execute antenuptial 
agreements approximate the fifty-fifty division implicit in the partnership approach or 
stand prepared to prove the agreements’ substantive fairness at the time of divorce. 
Id. 
195. For further background on the American premarital agreement, see Ryznar & St pie -
Sporek, supra note 183, at Part II. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Judges in England and the United States have been encountering big 
money cases with increasing frequency in recent years.  While both legal 
systems have pursued fairness in their division of post-divorce property, 
each has taken drastically different routes—especially in big money cases.  
Most American courts have employed the principle of equitable distribu-
tion, which frequently results in a disproportionate property division, 
particularly when the marital estate grew due to the efforts of one talented 
spouse.  England, on the other hand, recently implemented a yardstick of 
equality in White that produces near equal property division in many cases.  
While this shift does not significantly change the property awards in 
average divorce cases, lower income spouses in big money marriages 
receive far more than they would reasonably need or require.  Furthermore, 
this shift has created a significant doctrinal split from American law. 
Such recent developments in English law would be equivalent to a 
move by most American states from equitable division to community 
property.  Although such a change of law has not occurred in the United 
States, many lower income spouses have challenged their disproportionate 
shares of marital property in state courts.  The English divorce regime 
would be ideal to such spouses, but the clamor for divorce reform in 
England provides some support for the American equitable distribution 
principle.196  In many big money cases, however, the lower income spouse 
is already well situated under any approach and an absolutely equal division 
becomes only a matter of principle.  The dispositive question therefore 
becomes whether a legal system should aim to treat all spouses and 
contributions equally, or to permit exceptional contributors to retain the 
financial rewards of their work after providing for their former spouses. 
 
196. See supra Part III.A.2. 
